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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF AP MEAB 78-097 FOR JUNE 23, 1978  
 1. USSR-AFRICA: INTENSIFIED POLICY.

25X1

25X1 [ ] THE JUNE 22 HARSHLY WORDED STATEMENT BY THE USSR ON AFRICA MAKES IT CLEAR THAT MOSCOW HAS DECIDED TO INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO AROUSE BLACK AFRICAN OPINION AGAINST THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE, FOCUSING ON WHAT IT PERCEIVES AS AFRICAN RESENTMENT OF WESTERN MILITARY AND POLITICAL RESPONSES TO THE SHABA INVASION. MUCH OF THE STATEMENT ATTEMPTS TO ALARM THE AFRICANS ABOUT THE THREAT OF A COORDINATED RETURN OF "FORMER COLONIALISTS" TO THE CONTINENT "UNDER FALSE COVER." THE TONE OF THE DOCUMENT IS INTENDED TO HAMMER HOME THE MESSAGE THAT MOSCOW IS THE CHAMPION OF AFRICAN LIBERATION, THAT THE US IS AFRICA'S CENTRAL ENEMY, AND THAT DETENTE MUST CONTINUE TO BE ACCOMMODATED TO SOVIET DETERMINATION TO DEFEND AFRICAN "PROGRESSIVE" STATES AND CAUSES.

25X1 [ ] THE SOVIET STATEMENT IS EVIDENTLY INTENDED BOTH TO SEIZE NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND TO COUNTER WHAT THE SOVIETS SENSE MAY BE NEW VULNERABILITIES. WHILE SEEKING TO EXPLOIT "PROGRESSIVE" AFRICAN CRITICISM OF THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE ZAIRE CRISIS--PARTICULARLY FROM TANZANIAN PRESIDENT NYERERE--THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED WITH FIGHTING OFF

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WHAT THEY SEE AS RENEWED US EFFORTS TO APPEAL TO BLACK AFRICAN INTERESTS. THEY SPEAK OF "HYPOCRITICAL TALK BY HIGH-PLACED PEOPLE"--AN ALLUSION TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S COMMENTS AT ANNAPOLIS ABOUT THE US DESIRE TO SEE AFRICA FREE, AND SECRETARY VANCE'S REITERATION OF THIS IDEA ON TUESDAY.

25X1 [ ] THESE REMARKS APPARENTLY SUGGESTED TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE US WAS MOVING TO OVERCOME THE POLITICAL HANDICAPS FOR THE WEST THAT RESULTED FROM SUPPORT FOR ZAIRE'S PRESIDENT MOBUTU. WESTERN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR ZAMBIA AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A US EMISSARY TO ANGOLA HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY ADDED TO RECENT SOVIET CONCERNS.

25X1 [ ] AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW SEEKS TO CREATE A PICTURE OF THE US LEADING A RAPIDLY COALESCING ALLIANCE OF THE OTHER NATO POWERS, THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AND THE CHINESE AGAINST AFRICAN INTERESTS. CHINA'S SUPPORT FOR THE INTERVENTION IN ZAIRE IS CITED AS AN EXAMPLE OF PEKING'S SYMPATHY WITH NATO'S TACTICS ON THE CONTINENT.

25X1 [ ] MOSCOW IS PRESUMABLY STILL OBSESSED WITH ITS HISTORY OF COMPETITION WITH CHINA IN VARIOUS AFRICAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN TANZANIA AND MOZAMBIQUE, AND USED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA'S RECENT DISCUSSION WITH MOBUTU.

25X [ ] THE STATEMENT INDICATES THAT MOSCOW WILL PURSUE THE COURSE IT HAS BEEN FOLLOWING IN AFRICA FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS BUT DOES NOT APPEAR TO REFLECT ANY DECISION TO ASSUME MORE SERIOUS MILITARY RISKS ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIETS' AFRICAN CLIENTS. [ ]

25X1

## 2. USSR-ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: CONFLICT.

25X1 [ ] THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS CONTINUE TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT ETHIOPIAN PLANS FOR AN ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE IN ERITREA AND STILL PREFER MEDIATION OF THE CONFLICT WITH THE ERITREAN SECESSIONISTS. SOVIET EFFORTS TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT HAVE PRODUCED NO VISIBLE PROGRESS SO FAR, HOWEVER, AND NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR THE CUBANS HAVE RULED OUT AN EXPANDED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AT A LATER STAGE.

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5X1 [REDACTED] SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS CONTINUE TO MAKE CONTACTS WITH ALL THREE ERITREAN GUERRILLA FACTIONS. THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION, HOWEVER, OF RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT AHMED NASSER--THE CHIEF OF THE ERITREAN LIBERATION FRONT-- SECRETLY VISITED MOSCOW LAST WEEK TO DISCUSS A NEGOTIATED END TO THE ERITREAN CONFLICT. NASSER IS SAID TO HAVE MET ELSEWHERE IN THE PAST WITH BOTH SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN OFFICIALS, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD RISK FURTHER IRRITATING MENGISTU AT THIS TIME BY INVITING NASSER TO MOSCOW.

5X1 [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY RANKLED MENGISTU WITH THEIR PERSISTENT HECTORING FOR THE CREATION OF A "VANGUARD" MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY, AND SOVIET MEDIA HAVE ALSO BADGERED THE ETHIOPIANS TO LIMIT THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE CREATION OF SUCH A PARTY. MENGISTU'S RECENT OUSTER OF BOTH THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR AND A SENIOR SOUTH YEMENI DIPLOMAT WAS PRESUMABLY A SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS TO STOP INTERFERING IN ETHIOPIAN AFFAIRS.

25X6

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF AP MEAB 78-094 FOR JUNE 19, 1978.

1. OPEC: OIL PRICE DEADLOCK.

5X1

[ ] OPEC OIL MINISTERS NOW MEETING IN GENEVA HAVE FAILED SO FAR TO REACH AGREEMENT ON OIL PRICING. SAUDI ARABIA HAS PUSHED FOR NO CHANGE IN PRICES, WHILE OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAVE URGED HIGHER PRICES TO OFFSET THE LOST PURCHASING POWER OF OIL REVENUES CAUSED BY THE FALL IN THE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR SINCE THE PREVIOUS PRICE INCREASE IN JANUARY 1977.

5X1

[ ] SAUDI CROWN PRINCE FAHD ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY IN GENEVA SUNDAY, APPARENTLY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN AN EXTRA SESSION MONDAY. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER FAHD'S ROLE WILL BE TO LEND STRENGTH TO THE SAUDI POSITION OR TO ENGINEER A COMPROMISE WITH THE ADVOCATES OF HIGHER PRICES.

5X1

[ ] MINISTERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE CALLED FOR EITHER A DIRECT PRICE INCREASE OR FOR DENOMINATING OIL IN TERMS OF A GROUP OF CURRENCIES IN ORDER TO PROTECT AGAINST FURTHER DECLINES IN THE DOLLAR. SAUDI OIL MINISTER YAMANI HAS ARGUED THAT THE CURRENT WORLD OIL SURPLUS PRECLUDES A PRICE INCREASE. HE FORESEES A STRENGTHENING DOLLAR AND CONSEQUENT RECOVERY IN

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THE PURCHASING POWER OF OIL REVENUES.

25X1

2. BENIN: CUBAN AND SOVIET INTEREST.

25X1 [ ] BENIN HAS RECEIVED INCREASED AMOUNTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ADDITIONAL ADVISERS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE COUNTRY'S RADICAL ANTI-WESTERN PRESIDENT KEREKOU JUSTIFIES THIS SUPPORT AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT HIS COUNTRY.

25X1 [ ] //AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW KEREKOU EARLY LAST YEAR GAVE THE USSR AND CUBA A PRETEXT TO INCREASE THE MILITARY AID THEY HAD BEEN PROVIDING BENIN. SINCE THEN, THE SOVIETS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE PROVIDED BENIN WITH ARMORED VEHICLES, ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, SMALL ARMS AND AN ESTIMATED 30 MILITARY ADVISERS. CUBAN INTEREST IN BENIN HAS ALSO INCREASED SINCE THE ATTEMPTED COUP--WHICH THE CUBANS MAY HAVE HELPED SUPPRESS. THERE ARE NOW ABOUT 55 CUBAN MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISERS IN THE COUNTRY.//

25X1 [ ] KEREKOU WANTS TO ACQUIRE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, AND SOME BENINESE PERSONNEL ARE SAID TO BE TRAINING ON MIG FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE USSR.

25X1 [ ] //SOVIET AND CUBAN MOTIVATION FOR AIDING BENIN IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. SOVIET NAVAL UNITS HAVE MADE REGULAR VISITS TO COTONOU, AND ACCESS TO BENIN'S PORT AND AIR FACILITIES MAY BE A FACTOR. THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS MAY ALSO SEE BENIN AS A STEPPING STONE TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE IN WEST AFRICA. IN ANY EVENT, THEIR PRESENCE HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY KEREKOU WHO, IN ADDITION TO HIS DESIRE FOR MILITARY PROTECTION, PROBABLY SEES SOVIET AND CUBAN INTEREST AS A RESPONSE TO HIS ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE A MARXIST IDEOLOGY ON THE COUNTRY.//

25X1 [ ] //BENIN'S ARMY LACKS THE TRAINING TO ABSORB QUICKLY ALL THE MATERIEL IT HAS BEEN RECEIVING. IN ANY EVENT, AN ATTACK FROM ITS AFRICAN NEIGHBORS--DESPITE KEREKOU'S OBSESSION THAT A MILITARY THREAT EXISTS--IS UNLIKELY.//

25X1 [ ] KEREKOU'S PERCEIVED NEED FOR COMMUNIST PROTECTION AND HIS DEVOTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM ARE PROBABLY SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN MOSCOW'S INTEREST. KEREKOU'S RADICAL BEHAVIOR

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MAY BE TEMPERED SOMEWHAT BY HIS COUNTRY'S CONTINUING HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON WESTERN ECONOMIC AID.

25X1

### 3.//PORTUGAL-ANGOLA: SUMMIT PLANNED.

25X1

ANGOLAN PRESIDENT NETO AND PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT EANES PLAN TO MEET THIS MONTH IN GUINEA-BISSAU TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES APPEAR LIMITED TO DISCUSSING TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. BOTH LEADERS, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN EXPANDING ANGOLA'S TIES WITH THE WEST, A POLICY THAT MIGHT LESSEN ANGOLAN DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR AND CUBA. THE PORTUGUESE BELIEVE PROGRESS TOWARD THESE GOALS DEPENDS ON NETO'S ABILITY TO OVERCOME OPPOSITION AT HOME AND ON PORTUGAL'S SUCCESS IN ELICITING EARLY WESTERN SUPPORT//.

25X1

//DISCUSSION AND PLANNING FOR A PORTUGUESE-ANGOLAN SUMMIT Began LAST DECEMBER, BUT SEVERAL FACTORS INTERVENED. EACH SIDE HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE OTHER'S MOTIVES IN PURSUING CLOSER RELATIONS. SCHEDULING A SUMMIT WAS COMPLICATED BY NETO'S UNCERTAIN HEALTH AND BY THE TIMING OF PRESIDENT EANES' RECENT VISITS TO BRAZIL, VENEZUELA, AND THE US. IN ADDITION, THE PORTUGUESE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT HOLDING A MEETING BEFORE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ZAIRE HAD QUIETED//.

25X1

//SOME OF THESE OBSTACLES WERE OVERCOME LAST MONTH WHEN MELO ANTUNES, A NOTED LEFTIST AND EANES' PERSONAL EMISSARY, TRAVELED TO ANGOLA TO EXPLORE THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT WITH NETO AND OTHER ANGOLAN LEADERS. HIS VISIT WAS FOLLOWED SOON BY A FLURRY OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS--SOME MEDIATED BY LEADERS OF OTHER FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES--THAT CULMINATED LAST WEEK IN THE DISPATCH OF ANGOLA'S FIRST AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL//.

5X1

//EANES' ABILITY TO DISASSOCIATE HIS CURRENT INITIATIVE FROM ANGOLAN INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES WAS ALSO IMPORTANT IN PRODUCING A FAVORABLE CLIMATE. HE WAS PRAISED BY THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER FOR ABSTAINING FROM GENERAL WESTERN CONDEMNATION OF CUBA'S MILITARY ROLE IN ANGOLA. THE PORTUGUESE HAVE ALSO ABANDONED THEIR EARLIER INSISTENCE ON PRECONDITIONS FOR ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT--RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NETO AND JONAS SAVIMBI'S REBELS AND A REDUCTION IN CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE.

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IN ANGOLA.//

25X1 ☐ /PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE SUMMIT SUGGESTS THAT THE TALKS WILL FOCUS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, PERHAPS WITH SOME DISCUSSION OF MILITARY AID TO ANGOLA. EANES, HOWEVER, SEES FORMAL AGREEMENTS IN THESE AREAS-- WHICH COULD LEAD TO LUCRATIVE TRADE AND FINANCIAL ARRANGMENTS AS WELL AS TO THE RETURN OF BADLY NEEDED PORTUGUESE TECHNICIANS TO ANGOLA--AS MINIMAL OBJECTIVES. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A PORTUGUESE LEAD IN OPENING ANGOLA TO THE WEST//.

25X1 ☐ //THE LATTER OBJECTIVE HAS INTRIGUED EANES FOR SOME TIME AND REMAINS THE MAJOR LONG-TERM GOAL OF HIS ANGOLAN POLICY. HE RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH AN OPENING WILL REQUIRE BOTH THE STABILIZATION OF THE ANGOLAN MILITARY SITUATION AND WESTERN ECONOMIC AID THAT FAR EXCEEDS PORTUGAL'S LIMITED CAPACITY//. ☐ 25X1

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5. LIBYA.

25X1

[REDACTED] //THE LIBYAN CENTRAL BANK IS APPARENTLY PREPAR-  
ING TO RECALL ALL OUTSTANDING DINAR NOTES AND ISSUE A NEW CUR-  
RENCY. ONLY FORMALLY DECLARED ASSETS UP TO A CERTAIN MAXIMUM  
LIMIT WILL LIKELY BE ELIGIBLE FOR EXCHANGE. INDIVIDUALS WHO  
HAVE BEEN HOARDING DINARS PROBABLY WILL NOT DECLARE ALL THEIR  
HOLDINGS FOR FEAR OF BEING BRANDED ANTISOCIAL.//

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25X1 [ ] //THESE ACTIONS BY THE CENTRAL BANK WOULD BE  
CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT QADHAFI'S CALL FOR LIMITATIONS ON  
WEALTH. IN RECENT MONTHS, MANY WEALTHY INDIVIDUALS HAVE CONVERTED  
THEIR DINARS TO OTHER ASSETS OR SOLD THEM ON THE FLOURISHING  
BLACK MARKET, THUS AVOIDING THE IMPACT OF THE NEW REGULATIONS.

25X1 [ ]

25X1D

7. OMAN.

25X1 [ ] //THE ATTACK ON AN OMANI ARMY CONVOY BY THE  
MARXIST POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF OMAN ON 7 JUNE--  
TWO SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND SIX WOUNDED--WAS THE SECOND REBEL  
OPERATION IN DHOFAR PROVINCE IN A WEEK. FIVE BRITISH CIVILIAN  
TECHNICIANS WERE KILLED IN THE OTHER INCIDENT. THE ATTACKS  
WERE PROBABLY MEANT TO MARK THE 13TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OR-  
GANIZATION LAST FRIDAY.//

25X1

25X1X

[ ] DO NOT BELIEVE THE ATTACKS SIGNAL A LARGE-SCALE RESUR-  
GENCE OF THE REBELLION--WHICH WAS LARGELY QUELLED IN DECEMBER  
1975 WITH THE AID OF IRANIAN TROOPS--BUT THEY ANTICIPATE MORE  
ATTACKS ON "SOFT" TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY. THIS UNALARMED VIEW  
IS BASED ON THE POOR STRATEGIC AND LOGISTIC POSITION OF THE  
REBELS. A HANDFUL OF HARDCORE REBELS ARE STILL AT LARGE IN  
THE DHOFAR MOUNTAINS, BUT RESUPPLY FROM NEIGHBORING SOUTH YE-  
MEN IS DIFFICULT. THE COMING THREE-MONTH MONSOON PERIOD COULD,  
HOWEVER, TIE DOWN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND MAKE RESUPPLY OF THE  
REBELS EASIER.//

25X1 [ ] SOUTH YEMENI LEADER SALIM RUBAYI ALI STRONGLY RE-  
ITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT OF THE REBELS LAST WEEK.

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EAST ASIA BRIEF AP EAB 78-095 FOR JUNE 20, 1978

25X1 1. CHINA-VIETNAM: [ ] THE CHINESE OPERATION TO EVACUATE ETHNIC CHINESE FROM VIETNAM HAS BEGUN AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF COMPLEX POLITICAL MANEUVERING. A CHINESE SHIP ARRIVED OFF HAIPHONG JUNE 19 AND INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE THAT IT WOULD MOVE INTO THE HARBOR JUNE 20. SO FAR, THE CHINESE APPEAR TO BE COMPLYING WITH PROCEDURES SET OUT BY THE VIETNAMESE IN DIPLOMATIC NOTES DELIVERED TO THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN HANOI LAST WEEK. HANOI ON JUNE 9 MADE PUBLIC THE TEXTS OF THE NOTES, COMPLAINING THAT PEKING HAD NOT YET FORMALLY RESPONDED TO THEM AND "DEMANDING" A MEETING WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY TO DISCUSS THEIR CONTENTS.

25X1 [ ] THE VIETNAMESE WILL REQUIRE ETHNIC CHINESE FROM HO CHI MINH CITY TO TRAVEL 50 MILES TO THE PORT OF VUNG TAU TO BOARD CHINESE SHIPS. HANOI HAS PROPOSED THAT PEKING ALSO SEND SHIPS TO QUI NHON TO EVACUATE ETHNIC CHINESE FROM CENTRAL VIETNAM.

25X1 [ ] THE VIETNAMESE HAVE STIPULATED THAT NO CHINESE SHIP SPEND MORE THAN THREE DAYS IN ANY VIETNAMESE PORT AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE ENTIRE EVACUATION OPERATION BE STRETCHED OUT OVER THREE MONTHS.

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[REDACTED] THE DIPLOMATIC NOTES AND VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENTS OUTLINING DETAILED PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY ETHNIC CHINESE WANTING TO LEAVE VIETNAM INDICATE HANOI IS MOVING TO TRANSFORM A SPONTANEOUS EXODUS INTO A TIGHTLY ORGANIZED EMIGRATION PROGRAM.

25X1

[REDACTED] THESE VIETNAMESE MOVES WILL PROBABLY DO LITTLE TO REDUCE SINO-VIETNAMESE POLITICAL TENSIONS. REFLECTING THESE TENSIONS, PEKING ON JUNE 16 ORDERED HANOI TO CLOSE DOWN VIETNAMESE CONSULATES IN THREE CITIES IN SOUTHERN CHINA AND, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HAS RECALLED THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR FROM HANOI. IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO EMBARRASS THE CHINESE, HANOI HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS AGREED TO ALLOW CHINA TO OPEN CONSULATES IN HAIPHONG AND HO CHI MINH CITY LATER THIS YEAR.

[REDACTED] 25X1D

## 2. USSR-JAPAN

5X1

[REDACTED] THE SOVIET UNION ON JUNE 19 OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED TOKYO OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED JAPAN-CHINA PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY. A STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR POLYANSKIY EXPRESSED STRONG APPREHENSION THAT THE TREATY WILL BE "SPEAR-HEADED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION" AND WARNED THAT MOSCOW WILL BE FORCED TO "MAKE CERTAIN CORRECTIVES" IN ITS RELATIONS WITH TOKYO IF THE TREATY IS SIGNED. THE STATEMENT WAS APPARENTLY TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE RETURN TO TOKYO OF THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO CHINA, WHO IS PREPARING TO RESUME THE TREATY TALKS IN EARLY JULY.

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